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You Are Too Soft!: What Can Corporate 
Social Responsibility Do For Climate 
Change? 
Issachar Rosen-Zvi* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the run-up to the global climate summit in Copenhagen 
(COP-15),1 environmentalists, scientists, and politicians 
referred to it as a historical event. As COP-15 drew near, 
climate change activists and United Nations (UN) officials had 
high hopes that December 2009 would be a watershed moment 
for creating a new carbon-restricted global economy for decades 
to come. Furthermore, following the result of the 2008 
American presidential elections, many in the international 
community felt that the path was clear to finally include the 
United States in the agreement that would replace the Kyoto 
Protocol,2 and that developing nations—among them China 
and India—would also take on some binding and enforceable 
restrictions on Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. The 
European Parliament even had lofty expectations that an 
© 2011 Issachar Rosen-Zvi. 
* Assistant Professor, Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law. I am grateful to 
Eyal Benvenisti, Dorit Keret, Ariel Porat, David Schorr, the participants of the 
Environmental Law & Policy Workshop at Tel Aviv University and the 
participants of the Climate Change Governance after Copenhagen Conference, 
Hong Kong, November 4-5, 2010, for their valuable comments and suggestions 
on earlier drafts of this article. I also wish to thank Omri Rachum-Twaig for 
superb research assistance. 
 1. The fifteenth Conference of Parties (COP-15) to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change was held in Copenhagen on December 7-18, 
2009. UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE 2 (2009), available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/logistics/application/pdf/cop15_ifp_web.p
df. 
 2. Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change: Kyoto Protocol, adopted Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22. 
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emissions reduction of 80% compared to 1990 levels by 2050 
would be agreed on, possibly with a mid-term goal by 2020.3 
None of this happened, of course. The Copenhagen Accord,4 
accepted by twenty-eight parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),5 is a 
political instrument—rather than a legal one—and thus is non-
binding on the parties. Moreover, there was no agreement on 
concrete goals for GHG emissions reduction and no concrete 
financial commitments were made by developed countries to 
help poorer ones. In fact, the Accord contains only vague 
aspirational language asking nations to voluntarily reduce 
their emissions.6 The sixteenth Conference of Parties (COP-16), 
held in Cancun in December 2010, justified the pessimistic 
outlook that preceded it and achieved no progress on new post-
Kyoto targets.7 
In light of this failure of international climate change 
negotiations, it is incumbent upon governments, civil society 
organizations, and conscious citizens that care about the future 
of the planet to explore innovative methods to combat climate 
change. One such method is harnessing new regulatory tools—
often called “new governance” or “regulatory capitalism”—in 
the service of restricting GHG emissions. The question is, 
however, whether these novel regulatory tools can provide a 
(partial) solution to the world’s predicament. This study is an 
 3. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2050: THE FUTURE BEGINS TODAY – 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EU’S FUTURE INTEGRATED POLICY ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE 17, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&language=EN
&reference=A6-2008-0495. 
 4. REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES ON ITS FIFTEENTH 
SESSION HELD IN COPENHAGEN FROM 7 TO 19 DECEMBER 2009, PART TWO: 
ACTION TAKEN BY THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES AT ITS FIFTEENTH 
SESSION 4-9 (2010), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf. 
 5. See Lavanya Rajamani, The Making and Unmaking of the 
Copenhagen Accord, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 824, 825 (2010); see also United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, adopted May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849. 
 6. See Rajamani, supra note 5, at 831-35. 
 7. See Press Release, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), UN Climate Change Conference in Cancún Delivers 
Balanced Package of Decisions, Restores Faith in Multilateral Process (Dec. 
11, 2010), available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/applicati
on/pdf/pr_20101211_cop16_closing.pdf. 
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initial exploration into this question. 
The remainder of this article proceeds in three parts: Part 
II of this article discusses briefly the many facets of the notion 
of regulation. It argues that the study of regulation, and 
particularly that of climate change regulation, should go 
beyond traditional national and transnational regulation. It 
should look for innovative and hybrid forms of regulation that 
blur the distinction between public and private and destabilize 
the boundaries between mandatory and voluntary regulatory 
methods. Part III explores one such soft regulatory 
mechanism—corporate codes of conduct and Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) reports—and evaluates its effectiveness in 
the realm of climate change. In Part III, I report and analyze 
the findings of a large-scale empirical study I conducted with 
regards to climate change reporting by corporations. The study 
covers the codes of conduct and accompanying CSR reports of 
thirty multinational corporations (MNCs) in three sectors—
petroleum, automobile, and apparel—and from different 
regions around the globe for the years 2008 and 2009.8 I take at 
face value the hard numbers provided by corporations as to 
their climate change performance, as well as the actual actions 
they claim to have taken in order to reduce GHG emissions 
(rather than the softer public relations statements). On this 
basis, I assess whether such actions represent a real effort to 
combat climate change. In light of these findings, the 
concluding Part IV reflects on the main question posed by this 
article—namely, whether, and under what circumstances, 
codes of conduct and CSR reports can serve as a useful tool in 
the global battle against climate change. 
II. FROM REGULATION TO GOVERNANCE 
The perceived crisis of the centrist state set in motion a 
major shift, characterized as a transition from regulation to 
governance.9 This shift—informed and morally legitimized by 
 8. The CSR reports are generally published around April of the year 
following the year discussed in the report. For example, the 2009 CSR reports 
discuss the corporations’ performance in the year 2008, and the 2010 CSR 
reports discuss the corporations’ performance in the year 2009. 
 9. See Yishai Blank, Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local 
Governments in an Age of Global Multilevel Governance, 37 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 509, 517-18 (2010). 
Over the past few decades, the centrist state has been attacked from 
the right, center, and left for its inability to efficiently manage 
resources and provide services, its susceptibility to capture by rent-
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neo-liberal ideology10—is a response to the challenges of 
globalization, which has undermined states’ sovereignty by 
transforming them (both normatively and practically) into one 
among many norm-setting agents. It is also a product of the 
perceived failure of command-and-control regulation to cope 
with the complex, heterogeneous, and rapidly changing 
world.11 While previous conceptualizations conceived of 
regulation as the promulgation of binding norms done 
exclusively by states, current understandings point to the many 
regulatory institutions beyond the state—among them 
international, transnational and sub-national entities; social 
movements; non-governmental organizations (NGOs); and 
business organizations. 12 Further, there has been a 
proliferation of new regulatory tools spanning from classic 
“hard law” command-and-control regulations issued, monitored, 
and enforced by states to “soft law” mechanisms promulgated, 
administered, and implemented by non-state agents.13 In some 
cases the tools encompass hybrid “hard/soft” regulatory 
mechanisms such as enforced self-regulation,14 meta-
seeking elites, its lack of responsiveness to citizen preferences, its 
turning into all-powerful bureaucratic apparatus which hinders its 
democratic legitimacy, its want of creativity and flexibility, its 
coercive legislation and regulation, its oppression towards various 
minorities . . . and its infringement on the basic negative liberties. 
Id. 
 10. See Ronen Shamir, Corporate Social Responsibility: Towards a New 
Market-Embedded Morality, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 371, 371-78 (2008). 
 11. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise 
of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 356-61 
(2004). 
 12. See David Levi-Faur, Regulation and Regulatory Governance 3-9 
(Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & Governance Working Papers Series, 
Working Paper No. 1, 2010), available at 
http://levifaur.wiki.huji.ac.il/images/Reg.pdf. 
 13. See id., at 7–8 (distinguishing between “hard” and “soft” law). The 
definition of “regulation” used in this article is quite broad and follows Colin 
Scott who defines “regulation” as “any process or set of processes by which 
norms are established, the behavior of those subject to the norms monitored or 
fed back into the regime, and for which there are mechanisms for holding the 
behavior of regulated actors within acceptable limits of the regime . . . .” Colin 
Scott, Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional 
Design, PUB. L., Spring 2001, at 329, 331. 
 14. Enforced self-regulation takes place when the regulator forces the 
regulated business to issue rules and standards tailored to its specific needs, 
which are then approved by the regulator or sent back for revision if they are 
found lacking. The enforcement of these rules and standards is also carried 
out by the business that is required to establish a compliance administration 
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regulation,15 and co-regulation.16 
Two major transformations are associated with the 
emerging order of new governance: (1) a shift from public to 
private and (2) from mandatory to voluntary regulation. Each 
of these transformations focuses on different aspects of the 
regulatory process and particularly on two questions: (a) who 
are the regulators? and (b) how is regulation carried out? This 
article will briefly discuss each transformation separately, but 
it is important to bear in mind that real-world forms of 
regulation are inherently intertwined and the analytical 
boundaries between them are far from clear.17 
A. FROM PUBLIC TO PRIVATE REGULATION 
The shift from public to private regulation covers two 
complimentary transformations: one focuses on how regulation 
is carried out (whether through traditional regulatory tools, 
such as prohibitions in the criminal law or through market 
mechanisms), while the other centers on the identity of the 
regulator. The more important transformation for this article’s 
purposes is the latter, namely the emergence of new types of 
private and quasi-private regulators. Business entities, global 
financial institutions, NGOs, international NGOs, and social 
movements have become major contributors, both directly and 
indirectly, to the content and shape of national and 
international regulation.18 Among the new regulators, 
corporations—and especially MNCs—play a key role. With 
revenues exceeding the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of many 
and bear all its costs. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE 
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 106 (1992). 
 15. Meta-regulation enables the regulated actors to determine their own 
rules and standards while the role of the regulator is limited to monitoring the 
integrity of the work of the compliance administration established by the 
regulated entities. See Christine Parker, Meta-Regulation: Legal 
Accountability for Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE NEW CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 207, 217-
19 (Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007). 
 16. Co-regulation is a regulatory scheme in which the responsibility for 
regulation is shared by the regulator and the regulated entities. See Levi-
Faur, supra note 12, at 11. 
 17. See, e.g., Jason Morrison & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Private and Quasi-
Private Standard Setting, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 498, 499-500 (Dan Bodansky et al. eds., 2007); David 
Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261, 265 
(2008). 
 18. See Vogel, supra note 17, at 262. 
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developing countries, MNCs operating in such countries are 
able to exert enormous economic and political pressure on 
governments to regulate in a manner that is favorable to them, 
and thus become the de-facto regulators.19 Yet corporations 
shape the regulatory landscape in developed countries as well. 
They do so by using their immense power to influence decision 
makers through lobbying and campaign contributions, as well 
as by directly shaping regulation through sophisticated 
interpretations, evasions, and by “making rules” where none 
exist.20 
While for many years corporations approached 
environmental regulation as something that is imposed from 
above, devoting efforts and spending money to resisting it,21 in 
the new governance era many corporations have changed their 
attitude. They have begun to operate under the assumption 
that there is a business case for CSR, which often means going 
“beyond compliance.”22 As a result, corporations became active 
participators in a host of innovative regulatory practices, 
through both public-private initiatives (such as co-regulation 
and negotiated agreements)23 and unilateral voluntary 
practices (such as taking part in certification programs, 
adopting codes of conducts, and publishing annual CSR 
reports).24 
Corporations, however, are not the sole private regulators 
that have emerged to prominence in recent years. They 
compete (or cooperate) with civil society organizations (such as 
NGOs), social movements, and local communities—which work 
strategically to create new forms of consciousness, shape 
market preferences, and more generally, implement their own 
version of social and environmental responsibility. Civil society 
organizations entered the field of CSR following their failure to 
convince national and transnational regulators to issue “hard” 
 19. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 187-88 
(2006). 
 20. See Dan Danielsen, How Corporations Govern: Taking Corporate 
Power Seriously in Transnational Regulation and Governance, 46 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 411, 412 (2005). 
 21. See ANDREW J. HOFFMAN, FROM HERESY TO DOGMA: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTALISM 3 (2001). 
 22. Neil Gunningham, Environmental Law, Regulation and Governance: 
Shifting Architectures, 21 J. ENVTL. L. 179, 193 (2009). 
 23. See id. at 186. 
 24. See id. 
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regulation protecting the environment, and in light of their 
frustration about the many successful challenges to such 
governmental regulation from trade-oriented transnational 
bodies such as the WTO.25 Without fully abandoning their 
attempts to influence the more traditional regulatory 
mechanisms, civil society organizations began to also employ 
less formal—but often more effective—regulatory tools, which 
came to be known as “civil regulation.”26 
Civil regulation positions civil society organizations in a 
complex relationship vis-à-vis corporations, cooperating and 
competing with them at the same time. On the one hand, they 
use adversarial strategies to challenge the irresponsible 
behavior of corporations; for instance, through the 
sophisticated deployment of various forms of media they are 
able to gather and disseminate information about such 
behavior, organize high-profile “naming and shaming” 
campaigns, and orchestrate consumer boycotts all around the 
globe.27 Some of these campaigns—such as those against 
Shell28 and Nike29—were so successful that brand-sensitive 
corporations are willing to “voluntarily” adopt social and 
environmental norms, not mandated by hard law, in order to 
make sure they do not fall prey to the next campaign.30 More 
recently, even as such adversarial practices continue, civil 
society organizations have begun to cooperate with 
corporations, formally and informally, moving “from boycotts to 
global partnerships.”31 Such cooperation can take different 
forms, the most prominent of which are the many certification 
programs that have emerged in the recent decade in which 
NGOs “set standards, require external monitoring, and certify 
 25. See Vogel, supra note 17, at 264-65. 
 26. See Gunningham, supra note 22, at 197. 
 27. See, e.g., id. at 196 (explaining how, disapproving of the oil company 
Shell’s proposal to dismantle and dispose at sea an abandoned oil rig, 
Greenpeace garnered public support against the plan that led to a Northern 
European boycott of Shell gas stations and ultimately to Shell withdrawing its 
proposal). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See generally Vogel, supra note 17, at 274 (noting that Nike has made 
signifanct effort and investment in monitoring factory working conditions as 
more labor codes have emerged). 
 30. See Gunningham, supra note 22, at 197. 
 31. Joseph Domask, From Boycotts to Global Partnership: NGOs, the 
Private Sector, and the Struggle to Protect the World’s Forests, in 
GLOBALIZATION AND NGOS: TRANSFORMING BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND 
SOCIETY 157, 157 (Jonathan P. Doh & Hildy Teegen eds., 2003). 
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compliance.”32 
B. FROM MANDATORY TO VOLUNTARY REGULATION 
Regulation is often thought of as norms that are legally 
binding on the regulated entity. Under such formal 
conceptualization, the shift from public to private regulation 
entails a move from mandatory to voluntary standard-setting, 
since private regulators do not possess the legal power to 
promulgate and enforce binding rules on market actors. A less 
formalistic understanding of regulation, however, involves no 
such entailment. Although there is an apparent connection 
between the two shifts, the portrayal of private standards as 
inevitably voluntary and of public regulation as invariably 
mandatory is grossly inaccurate. The failure of governments to 
effectively regulate global markets led to the emergence of 
norms set by private agents—such as international financial 
institutions and institutional investors—which cannot be 
conceived of as “voluntary,” notwithstanding the fact that they 
are unenforceable by state agents, since corporations are not in 
a position to refuse to abide by such norms. 
An example of a private non-voluntary regulation is the 
“Equator Principles,” which require corporations seeking 
project finance to abide by specific standards that are dictated, 
audited, and enforced by International Financial Institutions.33 
While this private regulatory practice is not legally binding on 
the corporations, neither is it voluntary, owing to the 
indispensability of finance for large-scale projects and the 
monopolistic power that global banks possess over such 
financing. Another example is institutional investors using 
 32. Tim Bartley, Certification as a Mode of Social Regulation 3 (Jerusalem 
Papers in Regulation & Governance, Working Paper No. 8, 2010), available at 
http://regulation.huji.ac.il/papers/jp8.pdf. Governments and industry bodies 
also use certification programs as a “mode of regulation.” Id. In addition, 
certification programs can become more “public” if a governmental agency 
decides to adopt it as a perquisite for participation in a public program. 
 33. See John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Paper for Presentation, at 
Tel Aviv University, Global Banks as Global Sustainability Regulators: The 
Equator Principles 3-5 (June 2-4, 2010) (on file with the author); see generally 
About the Equator Principles, THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equator-
principles.com/index.php/about-ep (last visited June 12, 2011) (explaining that 
financial institutions adopting the Equator Principles commit to not providing 
loans when the borrower is either unwilling or unable to comply with the 
Equator Principles). 
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their proxy power to demand that corporations abide by those 
social and environmental standards dictated by the 
institutional investors.34 What is witnessed, therefore, is a 
variety of different types of norms that defy easy categorization 
as either mandatory or voluntary35—displaying various 
degrees of corporate discretion in adopting and abiding by such 
norms.36 
C. CLIMATE CHANGE GOVERNANCE 
The transitions from public to private and from mandatory 
to voluntary regulation are apparent in climate change 
governance. Market-based mechanisms are widely used to 
combat climate change by both state and non-state actors, the 
most prominent of which are cap-and-trade programs.37 The 
European Union (EU) was the first to institute a mandatory 
emissions trading program for carbon dioxide (CO2), called the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS),38 and 
was followed by other mandatory GHG emissions trading 
schemes, such as the Australian’s NSW Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction Scheme (GGAS).39 More interesting is the 
development of evolving voluntary GHG emissions markets, 
which includes all carbon offset trades not required by 
mandatory regulation.40 
 34. An example is the California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(CalPERS), one of the largest institutional investors in the United States, 
using its proxy power to enforce upon corporations the implementation of its 
Core Principles of Accountable Corporate Governance. CALPERS, CORE 
PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 4-6 (2007), available 
at: http://www.calpers-governance.org/principles/domestic/us/downloads/us-
corpgov-principles.pdf. 
 35. See Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Transnational Corporations and 
Public Accountability, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
122 (David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds.,  2005); Morrison and Roht-
Arriaza, supra note 17, at 499-500. 
 36. See Koenig-Archibugi, supra note 35. 
 37. See Carol M. Rose, Liberty, Property, Environmentalism, 26 SOC. PHIL. 
& POL’Y 1, 2 (2009). 
 38. For an exhaustive description of the EU ETS, see John C. Dernbach & 
Seema Kakade, Climate Change Law: An Introduction, 29 ENERGY L.J. 1, 12-
14 (2008). 
 39. GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION SCHEME, 
http://www.greenhousegas.nsw.gov.au (last visited Apr. 4, 2011). 
 40. For a good description of the voluntary carbon markets, see generally 
KATHERINE HAMILTON ET AL., BUILDING BRIDGES: STATE OF THE VOLUNTARY 
CARBON MARKETS 2010 (2010), available at http://www.forest-
trends.org/documents/files/doc_2433.pdf. For an analysis of the legal aspects of 
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Certification programs are another voluntary private 
regulatory measure used to combat climate change, mostly in 
the field of renewable energy. A renewable energy certificate 
(REC) program, also called a green certificate system, is a 
response to both governmental policies (the most common of 
which is the renewable portfolio standard (RPS)),41 and the 
demand of consumers (both businesses and households) for 
green electricity. These certificates can serve two purposes. 
First, in the case of governmentally-set obligations, they can 
act as an accounting mechanism, or even as a proof to 
customers that a certain amount of renewable electricity has 
been produced.42 Second, they can help to facilitate the creation 
of a market for green electricity and environmentally 
responsible behavior that functions independently from the 
market of electricity as a commodity.43 
Of voluntary private regulation, the “softest” and least 
institutional are corporate codes of conduct, which are the focus 
of this article. This article provides an in-depth analysis of the 
codes of conduct and associated CSR reports that are published 
by thirty MNCs from three different industrial sectors 
(petroleum, automobile, and apparel) and from different 
regions of the world (the United States, Europe, and Asia) for 
the years 2008 and 2009. This article asks whether codes of 
conduct can ever be useful for addressing climate change, and if 
so, what are the necessary conditions for their effectiveness. 
voluntary carbon markets, see Michelle Passero, The Voluntary Carbon 
Market: Its Contributions and Potential Legal and Policy Issues, in LEGAL 
ASPECTS OF CARBON TRADING: KYOTO, COPENHAGEN, AND BEYOND 517 (David 
Freestone & Charlotte Streck eds., 2009). It is important to note, however, 
that doubts have been raised lately with regards to the effectiveness of 
voluntary carbon markets due to the failure of the most prominent carbon 
market, the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX). See, e.g., Ezra Levant, 
Imaginary Exchange Goes Poof: The Green Scheme Known As The Chicago 
Climate Exchange Will Stop Trading Hot Air at the End of The Year, TORONTO 
SUN, Nov. 14, 2010, at O6. 
 41.  A RPS requires that an energy supplier provides a set amount of 
electricity from renewable sources as a share of supplier’s total sales. RYAN 
WISER & GALEN BARBOSE, RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A STATUS REPORT WITH DATA THROUGH 2007, at 2 (2008), available at 
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/lbnl-154e-revised.pdf. 
 42. See ED HOLT & LORI BIRD, EMERGING MARKETS FOR RENEWABLE 
ENERGY CERTIFICATES: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES, NATIONAL 
RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY TECHNICAL REPORT, at 15 (2005), available 
at http://apps3.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/resources/pdfs/37388.pdf. 
 43. Id. at 9-10. 
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The corporations chosen for this research are among the largest 
in the world in their respective sectors, and the sectors 
themselves represent industries with varying degrees of 
harmful effects on the environment.44 
III. CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
A. WHAT ARE CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT? 
Corporate codes of conduct first came to prominence 
towards the end of the twentieth century.45 Codes of conduct 
enhance corporations’ social and environmental commitments 
by articulating the norms and standards by which they profess 
to be bound.46 Although some state governments have 
encouraged this kind of disclosure either directly or 
indirectly,47 corporate codes and CSR reports are a mostly 
voluntary activity intended to give an account to external 
stakeholders of the social and environmental effects of their 
business.48 The reasons for the emergence and persistence of 
codes of conduct are both complex and contested. Corporations 
adopt them for one or more of the following reasons: in order to 
prevent governmental intervention in the form of mandatory 
regulation (known in literature as the “shadow of hierarchy”49); 
to limit political opposition to the growing globalization of 
markets; as a response to pressures from consumer groups; and 
as a means to protect their reputation.50 Be that as it may, 
most MNCs today, especially those based or operating in 
developed countries, cannot afford to operate without codes of 
 44. For a list of the Corporations see infra Appendex I, Tables 1–3. 
 45. See Ans Kolk & Rob van Tulder, Setting New Global Rules? TNCs and 
Codes of Conduct, 14 TRANSNAT’L CORP. 1, 4-7 (2005). 
 46. See id. at 3-4. 
 47. See generally KPMG INT’L, KPMG INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 4 (2008), available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Docu
ments/International-corporate-responsibility-survey-2008.pdf  (“One of the 
most significant findings of the 2008 survey is that corporate responsibility 
reporting has gone mainstream - nearly 80 percent of the largest 250 
companies worldwide issued reports, up from about 50 percent in 2005.”). 
 48. See Kolk & van Tulder, supra note 45, at 7. 
 49. See Adrienne Héritier & Dirk Lehmkuhl, Introduction: The Shadow of 
Hierarchy and New Modes of Governance, 28 J. PUB. POL’Y 1, 1-2 (2008). 
 50. See Tim Bartley, Corporate Accountability and the Privatization of 
Labor Standards: Struggles Over Codes of Conduct in the Apparel Industry, 14 
RES. POL. SOC. 211, 212, 220-27 (2005). 
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conduct.51 
Codes of conduct can take various shapes and forms—
widely varying in their scope, norms, and the monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms included in them.52 They can be 
adopted unilaterally by individual corporations or by a group of 
firms in a particular industry.53 Corporations can also 
subscribe to existing model codes prescribed by international 
organizations, NGOs, or trade unions.54 They can be authored 
independently or in cooperation with several stakeholders. In 
terms of scope, codes can touch on some or all of a variety of 
issues (among them corporate governance, prevention of 
corruption, human rights, labor standards, and environmental 
protection) and range from vague declarations of intent to 
specific detailed commitments.55 In terms of monitoring, they 
can be audited internally (first-party audit), by accounting 
firms, or by independent third-parties such as NGOs.56 Despite 
this variety, one crucial aspect of the codes is similar across the 
board—they are adopted voluntarily by corporations and are 
currently beyond the reach of the state’s legal apparatus. Thus, 
they rely on civil society organizations that use the market for 
their monitoring and enforcement. Such private agents require 
reliable information in order to become potent regulators. 
Without reliable and comparable information regarding the 
corporations’ environmental practices, achievements, and 
targets, the “market for virtue”57 cannot function. 
The codes and CSR reports are, I submit, a reliable source 
of information as to some of the corporations’ climate change 
practices and achievements. This is so because corporations are 
legally prohibited from making misleading statements in their 
 51. See. e.g., Ans Kolk, Sustainability, Accountability and Corporate 
Governance: Exploring Multinationals’ Reporting Practices, 17 BUS. STRATEGY 
& ENV’T 1, 4-5 (2008) (noting that 161 of the Fortune Global 250 companies 
publish sustainability reports, which indicates growing attention by 
multinationals on corporate accountability of non-financial issues). 
 52. See Kolk & van Tulder, supra note 45, at 3-4. 
 53. See id. at 4. 
 54. See Rhys Jenkins, Corporate Codes of Conduct: Self Regulation in a 
Global Economy 14-18 (Tech., Bus. & Soc’y Programme Paper No. 2, 2001), 
available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/codes/10/. 
 55. See id. at 19-23. 
 56. See id. at 19-26. 
 57. DAVID VOGEL, MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2005). 
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publications (which include the codes and annual CSR reports) 
and such actions are punishable under various trade 
legislations around the developed world, including the United 
States’ Federal Trade Commission Act (US FTC),58 The 
European Unfair Commercial Practices Directive,59 and the 
Australian Trade Protection Act.60 For instance, the US FTC 
guidelines on environmental marketing states that “[a]n 
environmental marketing claim should not be presented in a 
manner that overstates the environmental attribute or benefit, 
expressly or by implication.”61 Thus, while it is unlikely that 
outright false representations will be made in a corporations’ 
CSR documents, it is still in a corporation’s interest to depict 
itself in the best light possible and show that their practices are 
better than their competitors. Otherwise, why bother to 
prepare and publish a code of conduct and CSR reports? I, 
therefore, relied in my study on the “hard” numbers provided 
by corporations with regard to their GHG emissions reduction, 
which can be measured and verified, while ignoring the softer 
public relations statements they make. 
 
 58. In Nike Inc. v. Kasky, 45 P.3d 243, 258-62 (Cal. 2002), cert. dismissed, 
539 U.S. 654 (2003), the California Supreme Court held that factual 
statements made by corporations about their operations—the type of 
information that is found in corporate codes and CSR reports—are commercial 
speech and as such are subject to regulation preventing consumer deception. 
The case was settled before the Supreme Court reached a decision, but the 
California Supreme Court’s ruling remains good law. 
 59. Directive 2005/29, art. 5, 2005 O.J (L 149) 22 (EC). 
 60. Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (Austl.). For a discussion of the Act and 
the various green guideline issued under it by the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission, see Brian Preston, Climate Change Litigation, 26 
ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 169, 171-75 (2009). 
 61. FTC Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 
C.F.R. § 260.6(c) (1998). See also 16 C.F.R. § 260.5 (1996) 
[A]ny party making an express or implied claim that presents an 
objective assertion about the environmental attribute of a product, 
package or service must, at the time the claim is made, possess and 
rely upon a reasonable basis substantiating the claim. A reasonable 
basis consists of competent and reliable evidence. In the context of 
environmental marketing claims, such substantiation will often 
require competent and reliable scientific evidence, defined as tests, 
analyses, research, studies or other evidence based on the expertise of 
professionals in the relevant area, conducted and evaluated in an 
objective manner by persons qualified to do so, using procedures 
generally accepted in the profession to yield accurate and reliable 
results. 
Id. 
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B. THE “DIVISION OF LABOR” BETWEEN CODES OF CONDUCT AND 
CSR REPORTS 
Before delving deeper into the analysis, an account of the 
relationships between the codes of conduct and CSR reports is 
called for. As expected, the environmentally-sensitive 
industries studied in this research (i.e., petroleum and 
automobile) report heavily on environmental issues in general, 
and GHG emission reduction efforts in particular. This is true, 
however, only for the corporations’ annual CSR reports. The 
codes of conduct, on the other hand, are surprisingly dull and 
use, almost invariably, generic and non-binding statements 
regarding environmental protection. For example, the codes of 
conduct of corporations in the petroleum sector include vague 
statements such as: “[w]e continually look for ways to reduce 
the environmental impact of our operations, products and 
services,”62 “[w]herever we operate, we will strive to minimize 
any damage to the environment arising from our activities,”63 
and “Chevron’s policy is to maintain the safety and health of 
people and the quality of the environment where we operate.”64 
Furthermore, in most cases the environmental protection 
requirements do not even attain a separate section in the code, 
but are relegated to a subsection under the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) section. Similarly, the 
codes of corporations in the automobile industry contain mostly 
vague statements regarding environmental protection and 
contain no commitments to reduce GHG emissions. 
Thus, in order to understand the actual climate change 
practices, one has to look at the CSR reports published 
annually by the corporations. These hefty documents breathe 
life, so to speak, into the loose statements corporations make in 
their codes of conduct, translating them into detailed 
 62. ROYAL DUTCH SHELL, SHELL CODE OF CONDUCT 10 (2006), available 
at http://www-
static.shell.com/static/public/downloads/corporate_pkg/code_of_conduct_englis
h.pdf. 
 63. BP GROUP CO., OUR COMMITMENT TO INTEGRITY: BP CODE OF 
CONDUCT 16 (2005), available at 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/do
wnloads/C/coc_en_full_document.pdf. 
 64. CHEVRON CORP., BUSINESS CONDUCT AND ETHICS CODE 14 (2010), 
available at 
http://www.chevron.com/Documents/Pdf/ChevronBusinessConductEthicsCode.
pdf. 
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achievements, commitments, and targets. 
We can understand the seeming vacuity of codes of conduct 
containing abstract and rather empty norms, as compared with 
detailed CSR reports consisting of more concrete commitments, 
as an evasive maneuver aimed at avoiding legal liability. As 
described by Shamir65 and Bartley,66 NGOs and advocacy 
groups have begun to attempt to hold corporations accountable 
to commitments undertaken in their codes of conduct. These 
attempts, though so far unsuccessful, raised concerns among 
corporations and discouraged them from assuming upon 
themselves commitments that could be later interpreted as 
legally binding. The result is a “division of labor” between the 
codes of conduct and CSR reports that reflects an attempt by 
the corporations to minimize their exposure to the risk of being 
held legally liable while at the same time continuing to benefit 
from the advantages of CSR, including bypassing governmental 
intervention and protecting the corporations’ reputation from 
“naming and shaming” campaigns. 
C. CLIMATE CHANGE REPORTING 
The attitudes corporations manifest towards their 
environmental responsibility vary from sector to sector. In 
some sectors the environment is a major concern, while, in 
others, much less so. This is reflected in CSR reports. 
Environmental reporting is widespread in the petroleum and 
automobile sectors, and less so in the apparel sector.67 This is 
due to the diverse levels of risk—both legal and extra-legal—
each sector is exposed to, as well as the different expectations 
arising from their economic, regulatory, and social licenses to 
operate.68 Traditionally, NGOs, social movements, and 
conscientious consumers targeted corporations in the apparel 
sector for their labor practices and cared much less about their 
 65. Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims 
Act: On the Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 635 (2004). 
 66. Bartley, supra note 50, at 228–32. 
 67. The opposite is true with regard to labor practices. See Guy Mundlak 
& Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Signaling Virtue? A Comparison of Corporate Codes in 
the Fields of Labor and Environment, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
(forthcoming 2011) (on file with author). 
 68. On the social license to operate, as distinguished from other types of 
licenses to operate, see NEIL GUNNINGHAM, ROBERT A. KAGAN & DOROTHY 
THORNTON, SHADES OF GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND ENVIRONMENT 
41–74 (2003). 
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environmental behavior, while the opposite was true for 
companies in the petroleum industry.69 
That said, negative corporate attitudes to climate change 
are gradually becoming an exception to this pattern. Apparent 
differences do still exist between sectors in both the 
pervasiveness and the quality of reporting, but these are 
narrowing. Climate change stands out as something no 
corporation (at least those operating and/or marketing products 
in developed countries) can afford to disregard. The high 
visibility of climate change in both public discourse and the 
media, and the enormous social and political attention it 
receives, has resulted in the emergence of climate change as 
“one of the most important and urgent corporate responsibility 
issues.”70 There is also a growing uniformity in climate change 
reporting (mostly in form rather than in substance) as a result 
of the continuous efforts undertaken to standardize reporting 
by institutions such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)71 
and the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP).72 All the same, 
climate change reporting still varies both within and between 
industries, and it is therefore useful to divide the discussion 
accordingly. 
1. The Petroleum Sector 
Until recently, many corporations in the petroleum sector 
contested climate change being a serious problem.73 This is no 
longer the case. None of the corporations in the petroleum 
sector surveyed in the study contests the fact that climate 
change is a major global issue and that fossil fuel is a chief 
 69. See PHILLIP STALLEY, FOREIGN FIRMS, INVESTMENT, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 194 
(2010) (advocating a sensitivity to sectoral differences when conducting 
empirical studies). 
 70. KPMG INT’L, supra note 47, at 49. 
 71. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 
GUIDELINES (2006) available at 
http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/ED9E9B36-AB54-4DE1-BFF2-
5F735235CA44/0/G3_GuidelinesENU.pdf. 
 72. CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, http://www.cdproject.net (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2011). 
 73. See Robert L. Glicksman, Anatomy of Industry Resistance to Climate 
Change: A Familiar Litany, in ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND U.S. CLIMATE 
CHANGE POLICY 83, 83–106 (David Driesen ed., 2010). 
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contributor to climate change.74 To the contrary, nowadays not 
only do corporations pledge to lower their carbon footprint, but 
they also compete among themselves regarding which one is 
doing more to combat climate change.75 All the same, and 
notwithstanding the standardization attempts described above 
that brought about some uniformity in reporting, corporations 
still have wide discretion as to which environmental data to 
highlight and which to hide, as well as in their reporting 
methodology (i.e., choosing a baseline year from which 
reductions are measured, the share of holding that requires 
reporting, reporting data of operated versus owned facilities, 
and the like). As a result, oftentimes the data reported leads to 
an “information overload”76 and confusion, instead of clarifying 
 74. See, e.g., BP GROUP CO., SUSTAINABILITY REVIEW 2008, at 15 (2009) 
[hereinafter BP, SUSTAINABILITY REVIEW 2008], available at 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/e_
s_assets/e_s_assets_2008/downloads/bp_sustainability_review_2008.pdf; 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2008, at 12 (2009) [hereinafter 
SHELL, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT], available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/system/attachments/1307/original/COP.pdf?1
262614257. For a discussion of this transformation in attitude see Ans Kolk & 
David Levy, Winds of Change: Corporate Strategy, Climate Change and Oil 
Multinationals, 19 EUR. MGMT. J. 501 (2001). 
 75. Shell, for example, takes pride in its CSR report that “we were one of 
the first energy companies to recognise the climate change threat and to call 
for action. We understand we have a role to play in helping address this 
challenge . . . .” SHELL, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT, supra note 74, at 12. See also 
BP GROUP CO., SUSTAINABILITY REVIEW 2009 AT 14–15 (2010),  available at 
http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/e_s_as
sets/e_s_assets_2009/downloads_pdfs/bp_sustainability_review_2009.pdf; 
CHEVRON CORP., CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 2009 3 (2010) 
[hereinafter CHEVRON, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 2009], available 
at 
http://www.chevron.com/globalissues/corporateresponsibility/2009/documents/
Chevron_CR_Report_2009.pdf; TULLOW OIL, 2009 CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 25–27 (2010) [hereinafter TULLOW, 2009 CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT], available at 
http://www.tullowoil.com/files/pdf/tullowcr09_cr_report_2009.pdf. 
 76. For a general discussion of the idea of “information overload,” see, for 
example, Kenneth E. Himma, The Concept of Information Overload: A 
Preliminary Step in Understanding the Nature of a Harmful Information-
Related Condition, 9 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 259 (2007) (unpacking the idea 
that people have access to more information than is good for them); Oren 
Perez, Complexity, Information Overload, and Online Deliberation, 5 I/S: J.L. 
& POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 43 (2009) (arguing that information overload affects 
online democratic practices); . But see David M. Grether, Alan Schwartz & 
Louis L. Wilde, The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of 
Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1986) (arguing that consumers 
do not, in fact, find themselves with too much information). 
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the achievements and commitments undertaken by the 
corporations and facilitating a comparison between them. This 
can make it very hard to assess the merit of a given 
corporation’s claims. 
To highlight this problem, some examples are in order. BP 
reports in 2009 that in 2008 its total direct GHG emissions 
were 61.4 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MteCO2e), 
down 2.1 MteCO2e from 2007.77 Yet, it is noted in the footnotes 
that the data is reported only from operations under BP 
management control and that direct GHG emissions “are the 
physical emissions from operations on an equity-share basis. 
TNK-BP direct emissions are not included.”78 These 
qualifications turn out to be quite significant, making the 
general statement rather misleading. First, operations under 
BP’s management control represent only a small portion of BP’s 
actual holdings. Second, TNK-BP, which is excluded from the 
report, was in 2008 Russia’s third largest oil company, half-
owned and of enormous importance to BP, representing 24% of 
its production and 19% of its total reserves.79 Thus, omitting it 
from the report is not trivial. Moreover, later in the report the 
2.1 MteCO2e drop from 2007 is explained as following: “The 
principal reason for the drop in emissions is the change in BP 
Shipping’s treatment of time-chartered vessels to better align 
with industry practice for emissions reporting.”80 In other 
words, an accounting trick enabled the drop in emissions, not 
actual initiatives taken by BP. It is worthwhile to note that in 
the 2009 report BP demonstrates better reporting practice by 
candidly admitting the exclusion of direct GHG emissions 
associated with their 50% equity in their Russian associate 
TNK-BP from previous reports.81 Furthermore, BP reports that 
 77. BP, SUSTAINABILITY REVIEW 2008, supra note 74, at 6. 
 78. Id. at n.a, n.e. 
 79. BP GROUP CO., ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2009, at 27, available 
at 
http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/set_branc
h/STAGING/common_assets/downloads/pdf/BP_Annual_Report_and_Accounts
_2009.pdf. 
 80. BP, SUSTAINABILITY REVIEW 2008, supra note 74, at 11. 
 81. BP GROUP CO., SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 2009: ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT 37 (2010) [hereinafter BP, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 2009], 
available at 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/e_
s_assets/e_s_assets_2009/downloads_pdfs/Environmental_management.pdf. 
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in 2008 GHG emissions from the TNK-BP group of companies 
amounted to 22 MteCO2e on a 100% operated basis, and adds 
that “while we do not yet include our equity share of emissions 
in our reported total we continue to work with TNK-BP on 
emissions reporting.”82 
Another major energy company, Shell reports in 2009 a 
reduction of its direct GHG emissions from 82 MteCO2e in 2007 
to 75 MteCO2e in 2008.83 Yet, in the footnotes that accompany 
the report the company adds the following important 
disqualification: “Petroleum Industry Guidelines for 
Greenhouse Gas Estimate, December 2003 . . . indicate that 
uncertainty in GHG measurements can be significant 
depending on the methods used.”84 Moreover, the report notes 
that “environmental data are for our direct emissions. We 
report this way because these are the data we can directly 
manage and affect through operational improvements.”85 
Lastly, reading the report carefully reveals that about one third 
of the reduction in emissions was not due to performance 
improvement but a result of reduced production in Nigeria 
since 2006 due to the security challenges Shell is facing there.86 
Tullow Oil reports that between 2008 and 2009 its total 
emissions fell by 55%, undoubtedly a huge reduction.87 Alas, a 
deeper analysis of the report reveals that the reduction is due 
largely to the sale of the group’s UK Bacton facilities.88 
Moreover, careful analysis of the report exposes that when 
subtracting the reduction that resulted from the sale of the UK 
Bacton facilities, Tullow Oil’s emissions in fact increased in 
2009 due to a substantial growth in the corporation’s well-
drilling exploration program.89 
One reporting practice that distinguishes between 
environmental leaders and laggards is to determine to what 
extent a corporation proclaims concrete, verifiable and 
ambitious commitments with regard to future GHG emissions 
reduction targets. Such targets can later serve to evaluate the 
 82. Id. 
 83. SHELL, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT, supra note 74, at 36. 
 84. Id. at 36 n.A. 
 85. Id. at 36. 
 86. Id. at 20. 
 87. TULLOW, 2009 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 75, at 
26. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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success or failure of the corporation in hitting its declared 
targets, rather than just bragging about past achievements. In 
this regard regional variations between corporations are 
apparent: while American, British and non-western 
corporations generally fail to report any targets and 
commitments (let alone ambitious ones), continental European 
corporations do set targets, and in some cases very impressive 
ones. 
BP (Great Britain) is a prime example of a laggard 
corporation as it was criticized in its 2008 report by its auditor 
(Ernst & Young) for failing to disclose “future performance 
targets in relation to GHG emissions reduction.”90 
Unfortunately, this critique did not register with BP, as in its 
2009 Sustainability Review BP again fails to include any 
targets.91 Tullow Oil (Great Britain) does not even mention in 
its 2008 report GHG emissions reduction as a goal in its “future 
issues/targets” section.92 In its 2009 report, Tullow Oil is more 
candid about the influence of the changing nature of its 
business on its ability to report GHG emissions and to 
formulate meaningful emissions reduction targets.93 Chevron 
(United States) declares in its 2008 report, in the section 
dedicated to future plans, that it plans to “[c]ontinue to reduce 
flaring and venting in our operations where feasible.”94 Later 
on, Chevron reports that its total emissions for 2008 were 59.6 
million metric tons (mmt), exceeding its goal of 62.5 mmt, and 
declares a preliminary goal of 60.5 mmt for 2009, slightly 
higher than 2008’s actual emissions.95 In its 2009 report 
Chevron declares a preliminary goal for 2010 set at 59 mmt, 
which is slightly higher than 57.4 mmt, which was its actual 
emissions level in 2009.96 Lastly, Bharat Petroleum (India) 
 90. BP, SUSTAINABILITY REVIEW 2008, supra note 74, at 23. 
 91. BP, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 2009, supra note 81, at 37. 
 92. TULLOW OIL, 2008 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 7 
(2009), available at http://www.tullowoil.com/files/pdf/csr_08.pdf. 
 93. TULLOW, 2009 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 75, at 
26. 
 94. CHEVRON CORP., 2008 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 7 (2009), 
available at 
http://www.chevron.com/globalissues/corporateresponsibility/2008/documents/
Chevron_CR_Report_2008.pdf. 
 95. Id. at 14. 
 96. CHEVRON, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 2009, supra note 75, 
at 8. 
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declares a goal for 2010 set at a 0.7% reduction from current 
GHG emissions levels.97 Chevron’s and Bharat Petroleum’s 
practice of announcing such unimpressive goals enable them to 
declare any reduction, however small, in the following year a 
success. 
This is not to say, however, that Environmental leaders 
also do not exist (mostly in Europe). For example, ENI (Italy) 
commits in its 2009 Sustainability Report to achieving a 70% 
reduction of its gas flaring emissions by 2012 compared to 2007 
levels, adding that “thanks to this objective, the CO2eq 
emissions index per ktoe [kilotonne of oil equivalent] produced 
will be reduced by 40% by 2013.”98 Total (France) pledges to 
halve flaring at operated sites from 2005 levels by 2014,99 and 
projects that its combined initiatives will lead to a reduction of 
their direct GHG emissions from operated activities in 2015 by 
roughly 15% from 2008 levels.100 And OMV (Austria) sets an 
impressive target of reducing its direct GHG emissions from 
Exploration and Production and Refining and Marketing by one 
million tons, or at least 10%, by 2015, as the result of efficiency 
improvements.101 Interestingly, Gazprom (Russia) is also an 
environmental leader in this respect, setting the target of GHG 
emissions (including transport emissions) at 91 million tons by 
2020, which amounts to a 32% reduction from 2009 levels.102 
This regional variation in climate change related practices 
is by no means obvious. Most of the corporations included in 
the study are MNCs that operate and market their products all 
around the globe and the product itself (oil & gas) is not a 
“consumer product.” Nonetheless, as apparent from the study, 
the country of incorporation and the structure of shareholding 
 97. BHARAT PETROLEUM, RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT: CORPORATE 
SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2008–09, at 53 (2010), available at 
http://www.bharatpetroleum.com/pdf/BPCL_CSR_2008_09.zip. 
 98. ENI S.P.A., SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009 83 (2010), available at 
http://www.eni.com/attachments/sostenibilita/sustainability-report-09-eng.pdf. 
 99. Total cites the need to acquire the agreement of all of its partners to 
invest in the capital-intensive projects required to achieve such a target to 
explain the remoteness of the 2014 target year.  TOTAL, ENVIRONMENT AND 
SOCIETY REPORT 2009, at 13 (2010), available at 
http://publications.total.com/2009-
rse/beevirtua/data/TLCO_1004403_RA_TOTAL_BV_GB_ACC_bd.pdf. 
 100. Id. at 12–13. 
 101. OMV, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009, at 28 (2010), available at 
http://www.omv.com/Sustainabilityreport/SR09.pdf. 
 102. OAO GAZPROM, ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT 2009, at 34 (2010), available 
at www.gazprom.com/f/posts/05/285743/environmental-report-2009.pdf. 
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correspond, to a large extent, to the level of environmental 
responsibility demonstrated by a corporation. 
2. The Automobile Sector 
All the corporations studied in the automobile sector report 
their GHG emissions, and unlike the corporations in the 
petroleum industry, car manufacturers include in their reports 
not only GHG emitted in the production process, but also (and 
more extensively) emissions from their products—the vehicles. 
In their 2008 reports, most car manufacturers report their 
respective plans to decrease the carbon footprint of their 
products, setting specific targets and due dates. Renault, for 
example, pledges to achieve an average of 140g CO2 per km for 
all vehicles sold in the EU by the end of 2008.103 BMW commits 
to achieving CO2 fleet emissions of below 140g CO2 per km for 
all the group’s new vehicles in Europe by 2015.104 Volvo105 
reported that in 2008 average emissions levels in its European 
fleet decreased from 190g to 182g CO2 per km,106 and 
announced its target to reduce emission levels to between 90g 
and 100g CO2 per km by the year 2020.107 Toyota announced 
that it proceeded with its Fourth Toyota Environmental Action 
Plan—a five-year plan (2006-2010) designed to reduce CO2 
emissions by 35%.108 Volkswagen declared its intention to 
 103. RENAULT, 2008 REGISTRATION DOCUMENT 130 (2008), available at 
http://www.renault.com/en/Lists/ArchivesDocuments/Renault%20-
%202008%20Registration%20Document.pdf. 
 104. BMW GROUP, SUSTAINABLE VALUE REPORT 2008, at 25 (2009), 
available at 
http://www.bmwgroup.com/e/0_0_www_bmwgroup_com/verantwortung/publik
ationen/sustainable_value_report_2008/_pdf/SVR_2008_engl_Gesamtversion.p
df. 
 105. In the years covered by this study, Volvo Cars was fully owned by the 
American automobile manufacturer Ford Motors. In 2010 Ford Motors sold 
Volvo Cars to the Chinese corporation Geely Holding Group. See, e.g., David 
Pierson, Ford sells Volvo to China’s Geely auto group for $1.8 billion, L.A. 
TIMES (Mar. 29, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/29/business/la-fi-
ford-volvo29-2010mar29. 
 106. VOLVO CAR CORP., 2008/09 CORPORATE REPORT WITH SUSTAINABILITY 
7 (2009) [hereinafter VOLVO, CORPORATE REPORT], available at 
http://www.volvocars.com/de/top/about/environment_protection/Documents/Su
stainability_Report_08_09.pdf. 
 107. Id. at  15. 
 108. TOYOTA MOTOR CORP., SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2008, at 22 (2009), 
available at 
http://www.toyotainbusiness.com/Images/TMC_Sustainability_Report_2008_tc
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“reduce the CO2 emissions of our new-car fleet in Europe (EU 
27) by 20 percent over 2006 levels by 2015.”109 Lastly, Tata, 
clearly an environmental laggard in the industry (probably 
because its non-Indian market share is relatively small), does 
not provide any concrete CO2 emissions reduction targets or 
achievements, and only included general statements in its CSR 
reports, vowing to reduce emissions from vehicles that are 
being manufactured.110 
Apparent from this data are two facts: first, the level of 
commitment made by the various corporations in the industry 
is quite similar; and second, most corporations limit their 
reduction targets regionally to cars sold in the EU only. This 
turns out to be the key to understanding the reporting norms in 
the automobile industry, as well as their divergence from those 
prevalent in the petroleum industry. The almost universal 
reporting of GHG reduction targets in the car industry are due 
not to superior norms that evolved voluntarily in the industry, 
but to a different regulatory environment. A new regulation 
issued by European Parliament and the Council require car 
manufacturers to cap the average CO2 emission levels for 
vehicle fleets sold in the EU at 140g per km by 2012 and at 95g 
by 2020, with monetary penalties imposed on non-compliers.111 
m634-838999.pdf. It is, however, difficult to evaluate Toyota’s targets, since 
they use different metrics. Rather than using the common measuring method 
in the car industry —reduction of CO2 emissions per kilometer driven, Toyota 
measures reduction of emissions volumes per unit of sales from the 2001 level. 
This makes it relatively impossible to compare Toyota to the other car 
manufacturers in terms of targets set and achieved. 
 109. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP, DRIVING IDEAS: SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 
2009/2010, at 59 (2010), available at 
http://www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/vwcorp/info_center/en/publications/2009/0
9/sustainability_report0.-bin.acq/qual-
BinaryStorageItem.Single.File/VW_Sustainability_Report_2009.pdf. 
 110. TATA MOTORS LTD., GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE REPORT 2008–09, 
at 45–46 (2009), available at 
http://www.tatamotors.com/sustainability/pdf/GRI-report-08-09.pdf; TATA 
MOTORS LTD., 65TH ANNUAL REPORT 2009–10, at 30–31 (2010), available at 
www.tatamotors.com/know-us/pdf/CG-Report-2010.pdf. 
 111. Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2009 Setting Emission Performance Standards for New 
Passenger Cars as Part of the Community’s Integrated Approach to Reduce 
CO2 Emissions from Light-Duty Vehicles, 2009 O.J. (L140) 5, Annex I, 
available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0001:0015:EN:P
DF. Current regulation reduces the cap even further demanding an average of 
120g per km by 2012. It is also worth noting that on April 1, 2010, the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and National Highway Traffic 
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When taking this regulation into account, it is apparent that 
the norms correspond to the regulatory requirements with very 
few attempts to go beyond compliance. 
Interestingly, in their 2009 reports most car manufacturers 
cease to report compliance with the EU regulation, and instead 
discuss improving average fuel economy and energy 
consumption more generally. Volvo, for instance, announces its 
target for 2009–2012 to reduce energy consumption per 
manufactured unit by additional 15%.112 Toyota vows to 
improve average fuel efficiency—in all regions—by 15% 
compared to 2005 and reduce emissions per unit produced by 
29% compared to 2001.113 Renault pledges to reduce CO2 
emissions from internal combustion vehicles to an average of 
130g CO2 per km by 2012 for its entire fleet.114 Ford’s stated 
objectives are to “reduce CO2 emissions from our U.S. and 
European new vehicles by 30 percent by 2020, relative to a 
2006 model year baseline.”115 BMW, although not publishing a 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) announced a joint final rule establishing a 
national program aimed at reducing GHG emissions for new cars and trucks 
sold in the United States. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 
25,234 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600). The 
standards that make up the first phase of the National Program apply to 
passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles, 
covering model years 2012 through 2016. Id. at 25,328. They require these 
vehicles to meet an estimated combined average emissions level of 250 g of 
carbon dioxide per mile, equivalent to 35.5 miles per gallon (MPG) if the 
automobile industry were to meet this carbon dioxide level solely through fuel 
economy improvements. Id. Since the codes and reports reviewed in this study 
are from 2008, this new regulation has not yet affected the reporting. 
 112. VOLVO GROUP, VOLVO GROUP’S SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009, at 47 
(2010) available at 
http://www.volvogroup.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/VGHQ/Volvo%20Group/I
nvestors/Financial%20reports/Sustainable%20reports/sustainability_report_0
9_eng.pdf. 
 113. But see TOYOTA MOTOR CORP., SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009, at 18 
(2010), available at 
http://www.toyota.eu/SiteCollectionDocuments/Sustainability%20report%2020
09/2009_sustainability_report.pdf (noting Toyota’s commitment to meeting the 
EU-JAMA target of 140g/km in all markets, illustrating the manner in which 
the EU regulations have influenced performance in other geographic regions). 
 114. RENAULT, 2009 REGISTRATION DOCUMENT 150 (2009), available at 
http://www.renault.com/en/Lists/ArchivesDocuments/Renault%20-
%202009%20Registration%20Document.pdf. 
 115. FORD MOTOR CO., 2009/10 BLUEPRINT FOR SUSTAINABILITY: THE 
FUTURE AT WORK 4 (2010), available at http://corporate.ford.com/doc/sr09-
blueprint-summary.pdf. 
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new report for 2009, responded to a private inquiry stating as 
follows: “we intend to reduce emissions and the use of resources 
in our production facilities (Energy, GHG, VOC, Waste) by 30% 
in the period between 2006 and 2012.”116  And Hyundai 
declared its plan to achieve 50% improvement in vehicle fuel 
efficiency by 2020 compared to 2008 average.117 This shift from 
regional (EU) to universal improvement in average fuel 
economy and energy consumption validates the claim that in a 
globalized economy, regional environmental regulation of 
consumer products can result in a global “race to the top” 
phenomenon. This is so since 
[f]irms producing for markets with a high degree of environmental 
regulation and targeting high-end consumer markets have little 
incentive to use different production standards in areas of limited 
statehood [in which less stringent or no environmental regulation 
exists] thereby polluting the environment. They tend to transport 
their regulatory standards abroad.118 
A problem discovered in petroleum industry reporting, that 
recurs in CSR reports in the automobile sector, is the absence 
of uniform reporting methods. This leads to unreliable data and 
makes it impossible to compare between corporations. 
Corporations are thus free to choose their format and method of 
presentation in a way that makes them look more 
environmentally responsible than they actually are, and that 
hinders the comparative assessment of the achievements and 
targets of the various corporations in the sector. One such 
ubiquitous manipulation among car manufacturers (and 
probably among other manufacturers of environmentally 
sensitive consumer products) is choosing a favorable baseline 
year from which GHG emissions reduction is measured.119 
 116. E-mail from Jochen Frey, Corporate and Governmental Affairs 
Officer, BMW Group to Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Assistant Professor of Law, Tel 
Aviv University (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with the author). 
 117. HYUNDAI MOTOR CO., 2008 SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 44 (2009), 
available at 
http://worldwide.hyundai.com/Web/C_Sustainability_down/2008_report.pdf. 
 118. Tanja A. Borzel & Thomas Risse, Protecting the Environment – How 
Much State Does it Take? 11–12 (Nov. 23, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with the author). 
 119. In addition to the examples provided above, there are some additional 
examples of this phenomenon. Volvo projects halving its climate impact from 
goods transport by 2020 compared to 2005. VOLVO, CORPORATE REPORT, supra 
note 112, at 51. Honda undertakes to reduce its automobile and motorcycle 
emissions as well as its production emission per automobile unit by 10%, and 
its production emission per motorcycle unit by 20% compared to 2001. HONDA 
MOTOR CORP., HONDA ENVIRONMENTAL ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 13 (2010), 
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Since actual emissions reduction is a function of both the 
percentage of reduction and the baseline year, the power to 
choose a baseline year enables corporations (potentially) to 
manipulate the data by choosing a favorable year. Thus, if a 
manufacturer chooses the “right” year, the reduction 
percentage may look very impressive, but in fact may turn out 
to be an increase rather than a decrease from the previous 
year’s actual emissions. It also makes it difficult, and in some 
cases impossible, to compare the levels of reduction presented 
by different corporations. 
3. The Apparel Sector 
Environmental reporting in the apparel sector is quite 
lacking. The environment is not a major concern for 
corporations in the industry for two reasons: (1) the main 
inputs of the sector are not inherently toxic or otherwise 
burdening on the environment; (2) and no less important, since 
the apparel industry is labor-intensive and comprises of 
intricate supply chains, NGOs and conscious consumers focus 
heavily on the labor standards of corporations in the sector, and 
to a much lesser extent on their environmental outputs. This is 
reflected in both the codes and the CSR reports that, relative to 
corporations in the two other sectors studied, devote only scant 
attention to environmental norms. Yet, even in the apparel 
sector, we can see the exceptional character of climate change 
as an issue about which all corporations feel obliged to report. 
In fact, a clear pattern of improvement can be detected even in 
the two years surveyed in this study. 
The codes of conduct of most corporations in the apparel 
industry discuss the environment only briefly, usually as part 
of the health and safety section,120 while others, such as Liz 
available at 
http://world.honda.com/environment/report/pdf/2008_report_E_full.pdf. Mazda 
declares an objective of 43.5% reduction in emissions from 1990 levels. MAZDA 
MOTOR CORP., MAZDA SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2010, at 30 (2010), available at 
www.mazda.com/csr/download/pdf/2010/2010_n_p01.pdf. 
 120. VF’s Code of Business Conduct instructs the company to maintain a 
safe and healthy work environment and manage its business in ways that are 
sensitive to the environment. Code of Business Conduct, VF CORP., 8 (Dec. 
2006), http://media.corporate-
ir.net/media_files/irol/61/61559/CorpGov/Code_of_Conduct.pdf. Gap’s Code of 
Vendor Conduct requires all factories to comply with all the applicable 
environmental laws and regulations. And “where such requirements are less 
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Claiborne, do not mention the environment at all.121 A notable 
exception is H&M, whose corporate code takes the environment 
seriously, assuming concrete commitments and mandating that 
its suppliers act environmentally responsibly.122 
The CSR reports divulge a wide variation among the 
corporations in both the quantity and quality of environmental 
reporting. As with the other sectors studied, here too the 
variation reveals a clear regional pattern, especially between 
corporations that market their products mainly in Europe 
(leaders) and those that are more focused on the American 
market (laggards). 
In their 2008 reports Liz Claiborne, Quiksilver, and VF do 
not bother to discuss their climate change policy, achievements, 
or targets. Gap, Abercrombie & Fitch, and Levi Strauss include 
an environmental section in their reports, but their contents 
are frankly insipid, containing neither specified commitments 
nor clear targets. With regard to climate change reporting, Levi 
Strauss and Abercrombie & Fitch ignore the issue altogether, 
while Gap announced the completion of the first phase of an 
environmental footprint assessment across select owned and 
operated locations and pledged to develop quantifiable 
environmental goals based on that assessment by the end of 
2010.123 It also reported a reduction of GHG emissions by 20% 
between 2003 and 2008.124 No concrete targets for emissions 
reduction are set by any of the mentioned corporations. 
The 2009 CSR reports reveal real progress in climate 
change reporting. While Liz Claiborne and Quiksilver still 
ignore the issue altogether and Gap reiterates its obligation to 
complete the first phase of an environmental footprint 
stringent than Gap Inc.’s own, factories are strongly encouraged to meet the 
standards outlined in Gap Inc.’s statement of environmental principles” Code 
of Vendor Conduct, GAP INC., 5 (2007), 
http://www.gapinc.com/GapIncSubSites/csr/documents/COVC_070909.pdf. 
Quicksilver’s Supplier Workplace Code of Conduct manifests a similar 
attitude. Supplier Workplace Code of Conduct, QUIKSILVER INC. (Feb. 18, 
2008), http://www.quiksilverinc.com/code_of_conduct.pdf. 
 121. See Standards of Engagement, LIZ CLAIBORNE INC., 
http://lizclaiborneinc.com/web/guest/standardsofengagement (last visited June 
11, 2011). 
 122. See H&M, CODE OF CONDUCT 5, available at 
http://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileobjects/pdf/en/COMMON_CODEOFC
ONDUCT_ENGLISH_PDF_1124202692491_1150269822085.pdf. 
 123. See GAP INC., 2007/2008 SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 78, available 
at http://www2.gapinc.com/GapIncSubSites/csr/Utility/report_builder.shtml. 
 124. See id. at 79. 
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assessment, other corporations show an improvement from 
previous year’s reports. Abercrombie & Fitch, for instance, 
announces that it recently hired Clear Carbon Inc. to help them 
better understand their carbon footprint and improve their 
efforts to improve sustainability in their stores and home office 
campus. Abercrombie & Fitch also claims to have developed a 
baseline by which to measure future reduction initiatives and 
to help it identify potential reduction opportunities. The 
inventory collected, it concludes, will be instrumental in 
preparing its GHG reduction goal as part of its commitment to 
the Climate Leaders program.125 Similarly, VF adds a Carbon 
Footprint & Energy Efficiency section to its report and states 
that its 
long-term aspiration is to operate with optimum energy efficiency 
while continuously working to minimize our carbon footprint globally. 
In 2010 we will complete our first global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions inventory, and begin the process of identifying 
opportunities for reduction. Using 2009 as our baseline, by mid-2011, 
we expect to establish and communicate our long-term GHG 
reduction targets.126 
Levi Strauss provides for the first time a real reduction 
target in its Response to Carbon Disclosure Project 2010, 
announcing that it is working to reduce its carbon emissions by 
11% by the year 2011, compared to a 2007 baseline, and 
specifies reduction targets for different regions in which it 
operates.127 
The two European corporations studied, H&M and C&A, 
go much further than other corporations in the sector in terms 
of environmental reporting, thus positioning themselves as 
environmental leaders. A substantial portion of their respective 
sustainability reports are dedicated to environmental 
protection, providing real commitments and specified targets in 
a wide variety of environmental matters, including the use of 
chemicals in the production process, water and sewage 
 125. See Sustainability, ABERCROMBIE & FITCH, 
https://afcares.anfcorp.com/anf/intranet/site/afcares/sustainability (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2011). 
 126. Sustainability at VF, VF CORP., 
http://www.vfcorporation.com/corporate-responsibility/sustainability-at-vf (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2011). 
 127. See LEVI STRAUSS & CO., RESPONSE TO CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT 
2010, at 7 (Oct 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.levistrauss.com/sites/default/files/librarydocument/2010/10/carbon-
disclosure-response-2010.pdf. 
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treatment, and consumption of energy in the production 
process, transportation, and the stores. Particular attention is 
given by H&M and C&A to their carbon footprint. H&M’s 
Sustainability Report 2008 states that in 2005 H&M set the 
target of a 10% reduction in CO2 relative to sales within 5 
years, compared to a 2004 baseline.128 It also pledges to reduce 
CO2 emissions intensity by 5% per year until 2012.129 Another 
specified commitment made in the report is to make sure that 
by 2020 the energy per square meter of retail space would be 
reduced by 20% and that 20% of all energy consumption will 
come from renewable energy.130 In its Sustainability Report 
2009, H&M announces that not only did it meet its 2005 target 
but substantially surpassed it, achieving a CO2 emissions 
reduction relative to sales of 32%, compared to a 2004 
baseline.131 It goes on to set another target of cutting the 
group’s CO2 emissions relative to sale by a minimum of 5% per 
year compared to the previous year from 2010 through 2012.132 
C&A’s 2010 report vows to increase the use of renewable 
energy to reach 80% of their floor space by the end of 2010, 
saving more than 100,000 tons of CO2 emissions in relation to a 
2007 baseline, which amounts to a 22% reduction.133 
It is impossible to deduce from the data collected in this 
study what the reasons are for the environmental leadership 
demonstrated by H&M and C&A. A plausible hypothesis is that 
it has to do with the shareholders and the locus of operation of 
these corporations. Both corporations are based in Europe 
(H&M in Sweden and C&A in Germany), and the lion’s share of 
their sales also take place in Europe (more that 90% for H&M 
and 100% for C&A).134 Since European NGOs and consumers 
 128. See H&M, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2008, at 34-36, available at 
http://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileobjects/pdf/en/CSR_REPORT2008_P
DF_1240240530209.pdf. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See H&M, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009, at 42, available at 
http://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileobjects/pdf/en/CSR_REPORT2009_S
US_REPORT_1272005348413.pdf. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See C&A, ACTING SUSTAINABLY: C&A REPORT 2010 at 132, available 
at http://www.c-and-a.com/uk/en/corporate/fileadmin/mediathek/uk-
uk/downloads/CSR_Report_2010_en.pdf. 
 134. H&M, ANNUAL REPORT 2009, pt. 1, at 52-54, available at 
http://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileobjects/pdf/en/ANNUAL_REPORT_A
RCHIVE2009__ITEM_3_1269424409886.pdf; Bringing fashion to Europe, 
C&A INT’L, http://www.c-and-a.com/uk/en/corporate/company/about-us/ca-
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pay much more attention to the environmental performance, 
including climate change related practices, of private 
businesses, corporations that market in Europe are required to 
behave environmentally responsibly in order to not lose 
business or become the target of naming and shaming 
campaigns. Another possible explanation is the more favorable 
attitude of continental European corporate managers to their 
companies’ environmental responsibility.135 
The growing awareness of NGOs and consumer groups 
around the globe to the carbon footprint of corporations can 
also account for the clear pattern of improvement in climate 
change reporting standards in the apparel industry as a whole. 
Levi Strauss, for instance, candidly admits that “[c]onsumers, 
media and nongovernmental organizations are increasingly 
aware of climate change and the role business can play in 
reducing its emissions. As a consumer facing company, LS&Co. 
is at risk for negative publicity or nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) campaigns regarding our climate change 
impact.”136 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
What can we conclude from these findings? Are companies 
indeed increasingly becoming environmentally responsible and 
responsive to societal concerns about climate change? Or does 
the move to new governance merely represent better public 
relations strategies, with codes of conduct and CSR reports 
serving as a new form of window dressing? The answer to these 
questions is complicated. It is clear that codes of conduct and 
CSR reports are “too soft.” They are a rather weak regulatory 
tool, and it would be wrong to advocate for the replacement of 
more traditional state regulation with codes of conduct or other 
voluntary soft law mechanisms. Having said that, it would be 
also imprudent to dismiss such mechanisms off-hand as mere 
“green-wash” and forsake this path completely. 
The accumulated research has clearly shown that soft law 
mechanisms can be manipulated by corporations, but it is as 
evident that such mechanisms can also be used to bring about 
change. The question is, therefore, not whether codes of conduct 
international/ (last visited May 27, 2011). 
 135. See Gunningham et al., supra note 68, at 95-134. 
 136. LEVI STRAUSS & CO., supra note 127, at 5. 
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are inherently effective or ineffective, but what are the 
conditions under which can they be made effective.137 The 
following is a preliminary reflection on this question as can be 
concluded from the findings of this study. 
First, the “hard” regulatory environment, which serves as a 
background for soft law’s operation, is of utmost importance. 
Soft law cannot by itself provide an answer to the mammoth 
problem of climate change. For all their novel features, the new 
forms of regulation exist “in the shadow of the state.”138 But, as 
we have seen, the more stringent the hard regulation is, the 
more effective the soft law mechanisms that complement it are. 
Moreover, in some cases—particularly when consumer products 
are involved—regional “hard” regulation can have a universal 
impact and bring about an environmental improvement that 
spills over to markets all around the globe. Luckily, national 
regulators, local governments, NGOs and other public and 
private regulators do not have to choose just one among the 
many tools that are on the plate, but can devise and apply 
many strategies to combat climate change using, 
concomitantly, hard, soft and hybrid regulatory mechanisms. 
139 
Second, stakeholders’ market pressure can bring about real 
change in corporate attitudes and practices. This study 
confirms what many studies have shown before: that 
corporations operating in stakeholder-oriented countries or 
producing consumer products that are sold in stakeholder-
oriented countries are more likely to adopt a better attitude 
towards environmental responsibility.140 This is apparent in 
 137. See, e.g., Richard M. Locke & Monica Romis, The Promise and Perils of 
Private Voluntary Regulation: Labor Standards and Work Organization in 
Two Mexican Garment Factories, 17 REV. INT. POL. ECON. 45 (2010); Cesar A. 
Rodriguez-Garavito, Global Governance and Labor Rights: Codes of Conduct 
and Anti-Sweatshop Struggles in Global Apparel Factories in México and 
Guatemala, 33 POL. & SOC’Y 203 (2005); Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley, 
Organizations, Regulation, and Economic Behavior: Regulatory Dynamics and 
Forms from the Nineteenth to Twenty-First Century, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 31, 50 (2008). 
 138. David Levi Faur, The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism, 598 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 12, 13 (2005). 
 139. For an illuminating discussion of the beneficial effects of “mixing” 
hard and soft regulatory tools see Dorit Keret, Don’t Judge a Book by its 
Cover: Use of an Analytic Framework and Empirical Data in Analyzing 
Environmental Policy Tools (Unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
author). 
 140. See, e.g., Ans Kolk & Paolo Perego, Determinants of the Adoption of 
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the realm of climate change reporting as well. European 
corporations in all sectors performed better than non-European 
corporations and both performed better than corporations in 
developing countries. The more corporations that realize their 
markets are socially embedded and that customers care about 
these issues, the more they will become environmentally 
responsible. 
Lastly, and most importantly, this study has shown the 
critical role of transparency and standardization for the success 
of CSR. As this article demonstrates, most corporations feel 
obliged to report their GHG emissions and initiatives to combat 
climate change since they realize that they have to answer to 
their stakeholders. This development opens new opportunities 
for NGOs and state regulators. The challenge we face today is 
how to make the environmental reporting, currently quite 
deficient, into a better and more effective regulatory tool. The 
answer is more uniformity and substantive standardization in 
reporting in order to make manipulation of the data much 
harder and facilitate the comparative analysis of the 
performance of different corporations. Finally, NGOs and State 
regulators should leverage corporate attitudes in order to 
improve uniformity and standardization, which would be much 
easier to do (and much harder to resist) from a political 
standpoint than prescribing substantive norms for GHG 
reductions. Such improvements are needed for transparency, 
which is, in turn, the basis for the further ratcheting up of 
environmental standards.141 
Sustainability Assurance Statements: An International Investigation, 19 BUS. 
STRATEGY & ENV’T 182 (2010). 
 141. See Charles Sabel, Dara O’Rourke, & Archon Fung, Ratcheting Labor 
Standards: Regulation for Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace 
(John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 00-010, 2000), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=262178; see also Stalley, 
supra note 69, at 204 (advocating the making of ISO certification more 
transparent). 
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APPENDIX I – CORPORATIONS SURVEYED IN THE 
RESEARCH 
Name of Corporation Sector Country 
Abercromby & Fitch Apparel USA 
BMW Automobile Germany 
Bharat Petroleum Petrol India 
BP Petrol UK 
C&A Apparel Germany 
Chevron Petrol USA 
Chrysler Group Automobile USA 
ENI Petrol Italy 
Ford Automobile USA 
Gap Apparel USA 
Gazprom  Petrol Russia 
H&M Apparel Sweden 
Honda Automobile Japan 
Hyundai Automobile South Korea 
Levi Strauss & co. Apparel USA 
Liz Claiborne Apparel USA 
Lukoil Petrol Russia 
Mazda Automobile Japan 
ÖMV Petrol Austria 
Quiksilver Apparel USA 
Renault Automobile France 
Shell Petrol Netherland 
Surgutneftegas Petrol Russia 
Tata Motors Automobile India 
Total Petrol France 
Toyota Automobile Japan 
Tullow Oil Petrol UK 
VF Apparel USA 
Volkswagen Automobile Germany 
Volvo Automobile Sweden (USA) 
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APPENDIX II – SOURCES AND REFERENCES 
Table 1: Apparel Sector 
Document URL 
Abercrombie & 
Fitch 
ABERCROMBIE & FITCH, 
http://www.abercrombie.com (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2011). 
Sustainability Sustainability, ABERCROMBIE & FITCH, 
https://afcares.anfcorp.com/anf/intranet/site
/afcares/sustainability (last visited Apr. 15, 
2011). 
C&A C&A, http://www.c-and-a.com (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2011). 
Acting 
Sustainably 2010 
 C&A, ACTING SUSTAINABLY: C&A REPORT 
2010, available at http://www.c-and-
a.com/uk/en/corporate/fileadmin/mediathek/
uk-uk/downloads/CSR_Report_2010_en.pdf.  
H&M  H&M, http://www.hm.com (last visited Apr. 
15, 2011). 
Code of Conduct H & M, CODE OF CONDUCT, available at 
http://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileob
jects/pdf/en/COMMON_CODEOFCONDUC
T_ENGLISH_PDF_1124202692491_115026
9822085.pdf. 
Sustainability 
Report 2008 
H&M, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2008, 
available at 
http://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileob
jects/pdf/en/CSR_REPORT2008_PDF_1240
240530209.pdf. 
Sustainability 
Report 2009 
H&M, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009, 
available at 
http://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileob
jects/pdf/en/CSR_REPORT2009_SUS_REP
ORT_1272005348413.pdf.  
Gap Inc. GAP, http://www.gap.com (last visited Apr. 
15, 2011). 
Code of Vendor 
Conduct 
GAP INC., CODE OF VENDOR CONDUCT, 
available at 
http://www.gapinc.com/GapIncSubSites/csr/
documents/COVC_070909.pdf.  
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2007/2008 Social 
Responsibility 
Report 
2007/2008 Social Responsibility Report, 
GAP INC., 
http://www2.gapinc.com/GapIncSubSites/cs
r/Utility/report_builder.shtml (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2011). 
Goals and 
Progress - 
Environment 
Goals and Progress, GAP INC., 
http://www.gapinc.com/GapIncSubSites/csr/
Goals/Environment/En_Goals.shtml (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
Levi Straus & 
Co. 
LEVI’S, http://www.levi.com (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2011). 
Worldwide Code 
of Business 
Conduct 
LEVI STRAUSS & CO., WORLDWIDE CODE OF 
BUSINESS CONDUCT (2010), available at 
http://levistrauss.com/sites/default/files/libr
arydocument/2010/5/wwcoc-english_0.pdf. 
Global Sourcing 
and Operating 
Guidelines 
LEVI STRAUSS & CO., GLOBAL SOURCING 
AND OPERATING GUIDELINES, available at 
http://levistrauss.com/sites/default/files/libr
arydocument/2010/4/Sourcing_and_Operati
ng_Guidelines.pdf.  
2008 Annual 
Report 
LEVI STRAUSS & CO., PROFITS. PRINCIPLES. 
2008 ANNUAL REPORT, available at 
http://levistrauss.com/sites/default/files/libr
arydocument/2010/4/AR_2008.pdf. 
Climate Change 
Impact 
LEVI STRAUSS & CO., CLIMATE CHANGE, 
available at 
http://levistrauss.com/sites/default/files/libr
arydocument/2010/9/climate-change.pdf. 
Carbon 
Disclosure 
LEVI STRAUSS & CO., RESPONSE TO CARBON 
DISCLOSURE PROJECT 2010 (Oct. 28, 2010), 
available at 
http://www.levistrauss.com/sites/default/file
s/librarydocument/2010/10/carbon-
disclosure-response-2010.pdf.  
Liz Claiborne LIZ CLAIBORNE, 
http://www.lizclaiborneinc.com (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2011). 
Code of Conduct LIZ CLAIBORNE INC., CODE OF CONDUCT, 
available at 
http://lizclaiborneinc.com/web/guest/search/j
ournal_content/56/10123/10668. 
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Philanthropic 
Programs 
Philanthropic Programs, LIZ CLAIBORNE 
INC., 
http://lizclaiborneinc.com/web/guest/overvie
wofprograms (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
Quiksilver QUIKSILVER, INC., 
http://www.quiksilverinc.com (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2011). 
Supplier 
Workplace Code 
Of Conduct 
QUIKSILVER INC., SUPPLIER WORKPLACE 
CODE OF CONDUCT (Feb. 18, 2008), 
available at 
http://www.quiksilverinc.com/code_of_condu
ct.pdf.  
Annual Report 
2008 
QUIKSILVER INC., QUIKSILVER ANNUAL 
REPORT 2008, available at 
http://www.quiksilverinc.com/AnnualReport
s/Quiksilver_Annual_Report_2008.pdf.  
VF VF CORPORATION, http://www.vfc.com (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
Code of Business 
Conduct 
VF CORP., CODE OF BUSINESS CONDUCT 
(Dec. 2006), available at 
http://media.corporate-
ir.net/media_files/irol/61/61559/CorpGov/Co
de_of_Conduct.pdf.  
Global 
Compliance 
Principles 
VF CORP., GLOBAL COMPLIANCE 
PRINCIPLES, available at 
http://www.vfc.com/VF/corporation/resource
s/images/Content-Pages/Corporate-
Responsibility/VFC-Global-Compliance-
Principles.pdf.  
Global 
Compliance 
Report 2005 
VF CORP., GLOBAL COMPLIANCE REPORT 
2005, available at 
http://www.vfc.com/VF/corporation/resource
s/images/Content-Pages/Corporate-
Responsibility/VFC_Glo_Compli_Report.pdf
.  
Sustainability at 
VF 
 Sustainability at VF, VF CORP., 
http://www.vfcorporation.com/corporate-
responsibility/sustainability-at-vf (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2011).  
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Table 2: Oil & Gas Sector 
Bharat 
Petroleum 
BHARAT PETROLEUM, 
http://www.bharatpetroleum.com (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
Corporate 
Sustainability 
Report 2008/9 
 BHARAT PETROLEUM, RESPONSIBLE 
DEVELOPMENT: CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY 
REPORT 2008–09 (2010), available at 
http://www.bharatpetroleum.com/pdf/BPCL
_CSR_2008_09.zip. 
BP BP, http://www.bp.com (last visited Apr. 15, 
2011). 
Annual Report 
and Accounts 
2009 
BP GROUP CO., ANNUAL REPORT AND 
ACCOUNTS 2009, available at 
http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globa
lbp/globalbp_uk_english/set_branch/STAGI
NG/common_assets/downloads/pdf/BP_Ann
ual_Report_and_Accounts_2009.pdf 
Code of Conduct  BP GROUP CO., OUR COMMITMENT TO 
INTEGRITY: BP CODE OF CONDUCT (2005), 
available at 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/gl
obalbp/STAGING/global_assets/downloads/
C/coc_en_full_document.pdf. 
Sustainability 
Review 2008 
BP GROUP CO., SUSTAINABILITY REVIEW 
2008 (2009), available at 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/gl
obalbp/STAGING/global_assets/e_s_assets/e
_s_assets_2008/downloads/bp_sustainabilit
y_review_2008.pdf. 
Sustainability 
Review 2009 
BP GROUP CO., SUSTAINABILITY REVIEW 
2009 (2010),  available at 
http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globa
lbp/STAGING/global_assets/e_s_assets/e_s_
assets_2009/downloads_pdfs/bp_sustainabil
ity_review_2009.pdf. 
TNK-BP - 
Evaluation of 
GHG Emissions 
Programs and Initiatives, TNK-BP, 
http://www.tnk-bp.com/hse/programs/gases-
emissions (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
Chevron CHEVRON, http://www.chevron.com (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
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Business 
Conduct and 
Ethics Code 
CHEVRON CORP., BUSINESS CONDUCT AND 
ETHICS CODE (2010), available at 
http://www.chevron.com/Documents/Pdf/Ch
evronBusinessConductEthicsCode.pdf. 
Corporate 
Responsibility 
Report 2008 
CHEVRON CORP., 2008 CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT (2009), available at 
http://www.chevron.com/globalissues/corpor
ateresponsibility/2008/documents/Chevron_
CR_Report_2008.pdf. 
Corporate 
Responsibility 
Report 2009 
CHEVRON CORP., CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 2009 (2010), 
available at 
http://www.chevron.com/globalissues/corpor
ateresponsibility/2009/documents/Chevron_
CR_Report_2009.pdf; 
ENI ENI, http://www.eni.com (last visited Apr. 
15, 2011). 
Sustainability 
Report 2009 
ENI, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009 (2010), 
available at 
http://www.eni.com/attachments/sostenibilit
a/sustainability-report-09-eng.pdf. 
Gazprom GAZPROM, http://www.gazprom.com (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
Environmental 
Report 2009 
GAZPROM, ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT 2009 
(2010), available at 
www.gazprom.com/f/posts/05/285743/envir
onmental-report-2009.pdf. 
Lukoil LUKOIL, http://www.lukoil.com (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2011). 
Sustainability 
Report 2007/08 
LUKOIL, 2007-2008 SUSTAINABILITY 
REPORT: RUSSIAN FEDERATION, available at 
http://www.lukoil.com/materials/doc/reports
/Social/lukoil_eng_07-08.pdf. 
ÖMV ÖMV, http://www.omv.com (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2001). 
Sustainability 
Report 2009 
ÖMV, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009 (2010), 
available at 
http://www.omv.com/Sustainabilityreport/S
R09.pdf. 
Shell SHELL, http://www.shell.com (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2011). 
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Code of Conduct  ROYAL DUTCH SHELL, SHELL CODE OF 
CONDUCT (2006), available at http://www-
static.shell.com/static/public/downloads/cor
porate_pkg/code_of_conduct_english.pdf. 
Sustainability 
Report 2008 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL, SUSTAINABILITY 
REPORT 2008 (2009), available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/system/att
achments/1307/original/COP.pdf?12626142
57. 
Sustainability 
Report 2009 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL, SUSTAINABILITY 
REPORT 2009, available at 
http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2009/ 
servicepages/downloads/files/all_shell_sr09.
pdf. 
Surgutneftegas SURGUTNEFTEGAS, 
http://www.surgutneftegas.ru (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2011). 
Environmental 
Report 2009 
SURGUTNEFTEGAS, ENVIRONMENTAL 
REPORT 2009, available at 
http://www.surgutneftegas.ru/uploaded/ekol
ogia2009titul.pdf. 
Total TOTAL, http://www.total.com (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2011). 
Environment 
and Society 
Report 2009 
TOTAL, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY 
REPORT 2009 (2010), available at 
http://publications.total.com/2009-
rse/beevirtua/data/TLCO_1004403_RA_TO
TAL_BV_GB_ACC_bd.pdf. 
Tullow Oil TULLOW OIL, http://www.tullowoil.com (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
Code of Business 
Conduct 
TULLOW OIL, CODE OF BUSINESS CONDUCT 
(2009), available at 
http://www.tullowoil.com/files/pdf/Code_of_
Business_Conduct_2009_Rev_2.pdf. 
Delivering 
growth 
responsibly 
TULLOW OIL, DELIVERING GROWTH 
RESPONSIBLY (2008), available at 
http://smartpdf.blacksunplc.com/tullow2008
csr/Tullow_2008_CSR.pdf.  
Environmental 
health and safety 
policy 
TULLOW OIL, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND 
SAFETY POLICY (2009), available at 
http://www.tullowoil.com/files/pdf/EHS_poli
cy.pdf.  
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Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Policy 
 TULLOW OIL, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
POLICY (2009), available at 
http://www.tullowoil.com/files/pdf/CSR_poli
cy.pdf. 
Corporate 
Responsibility 
Report 2009 
TULLOW OIL, 2009 CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT (2010), available at 
http://www.tullowoil.com/files/pdf/tullowcr0
9_cr_report_2009.pdf. 
 
Table 3: Automobile Sector 
BMW BMW GROUP, http://www.bmwgroup.com 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
Compliance. 
Acting 
Responsibly and 
Lawfully 
BMW GROUP, COMPLIANCE. ACTING 
RESPONSIBLY AND LAWFULLY (2008), 
available at 
http://www.bmwgroup.com/bmwgroup_prod
/e/0_0_www_bmwgroup_com/unternehmen/
unternehmensprofil/compliance/BMWGrou
p_Legal_Compliance_Code.pdf. 
Environmental 
Protection. BMW 
Group 
Environmental 
Guidelines. 
BMW GROUP, ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION. BMW GROUP ENVIRONMENTAL 
GUIDELINES (2003), available at 
http://www.bmwgroup.com/bmwgroup_prod
/e/0_0_www_bmwgroup_com/verantwortung
/publikationen/downloads/_pdf/BMWGroup
_Environmental_Guidelines.pdf. 
Sustainable 
Value Report 
2008  
BMW GROUP, SUSTAINABLE VALUE REPORT 
2008 (2009), available at 
http://www.bmwgroup.com/e/0_0_www_bm
wgroup_com/verantwortung/publikationen/s
ustainable_value_report_2008/_pdf/SVR_20
08_engl_Gesamtversion.pdf. 
Ford FORD MOTOR CO., http://corporate.ford.com 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
Sustainability  FORD MOTOR CO., 2009/10 BLUEPRINT FOR 
SUSTAINABILITY: THE FUTURE AT WORK 
(2010),  http://corporate.ford.com/doc/sr09-
blueprint-summary.pdf. 
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GHG Emission Operational Energy Use and CO2 
Emissions, FORD MOTOR CO., 
http://corporate.ford.com/microsites/sustain
ability-report-2009-10/environment-data-
energy (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
Progress and 
Goals 
Progress and Goals, FORD MOTOR CO., 
http://corporate.ford.com/microsites/sustain
ability-report-2009-10/environment-
progress (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
Honda HONDA WORLDWIDE, 
http://world.honda.com (last visited Apr. 15, 
2011). 
Environmental 
Annual Report 
2009 
HONDA MOTOR CORP., HONDA 
ENVIRONMENTAL ANNUAL REPORT 2009, 
available at 
http://world.honda.com/environment/report/
pdf/2009_report_E_full.pdf. 
Environmental 
Annual Report 
2010 
HONDA MOTOR CORP., HONDA 
ENVIRONMENTAL ANNUAL REPORT 2010 
(2010), available at 
http://world.honda.com/environment/report/
download/2010/2010_report_E_full.pdf. 
Hyundai HYUNDAI, http://worldwide.hyundai.com 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
Sustainability 
Report 2010 
HYUNDAI MOTOR CO., 2008 
SUSTAINABILITY REPORT (2009), available 
at 
http://worldwide.hyundai.com/Web/C_Sust
ainability_down/2008_report.pdf. 
Mazda MAZDA, http://www.mazda.com (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2011). 
Sustainability 
Report 2010 
MAZDA MOTOR CORP., MAZDA 
SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2010 (2010), 
available at 
http://www.mazda.com/csr/download/pdf/2
010/2010_n_p01.pdf.  
Renault RENAULT, http://www.renault.com (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2011).  
Code of Good 
Conduct 
RENAULT, CODE OF GOOD CONDUCT, 
available at 
http://www.renault.com/en/Lists/ArchivesD
ocuments/Renault%20-
%20Code%20of%20ethics%20-%20en.pdf. 
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Annual Report 
2008 
RENAULT, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, available 
at 
http://www.renault.com/en/Lists/ArchivesD
ocuments/Renault%20-
%202008%20Annual%20Report.pdf. 
Annual Report 
2009 
RENAULT, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, available 
at 
http://www.renault.com/en/Lists/ArchivesD
ocuments/Renault%20-
%202009%20Interactive%20Annual%20Rep
ort.pdf. 
Registration 
Document 2008  
RENAULT, 2008 REGISTRATION DOCUMENT 
(2008), available at 
http://www.renault.com/en/Lists/ArchivesD
ocuments/Renault%20-%202008%20Regis 
tration%20Document.pdf. 
Registration 
Document 2009 
RENAULT, 2009 REGISTRATION DOCUMENT 
(2009), available at 
http://www.renault.com/en/Lists/ArchivesD
ocuments/Renault%20-%202009%20Regis 
tration%20Document.pdf. 
Tata Motors TATA MOTORS, http://www.tatamotors.com 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
Code of Conduct 
2008 
Tata Code of Conduct, TATA MOTORS LTD. 
(Oct. 1, 2008), 
http://www.tata.com/aboutus/articles/inside.
aspx?artid=NyGNnLHkaAc=. 
Global Reporting 
Initiative Report 
2008-09  
TATA MOTORS LTD., GLOBAL REPORTING 
INITIATIVE REPORT 2008–09 (2009), 
available at 
http://www.tatamotors.com/sustainability/p
df/GRI-report-08-09.pdf 
Social 
Responsibility 
Annual Report 
2008-2009 
Social Responsibility Annual Report 2008-
2009, TATA MOTORS LTD., 
http://www.tatamotors.com/sustainability/C
SR-09/content.php (last visited Apr. 15, 
2011). 
Social 
Responsibility 
Annual Report 
2009-10 
Social Responsibility Annual Report 2009 – 
10, TATA MOTORS LTD., 
http://www.tatamotors.com/sustainability/C
SR-10/content.php (last visited Apr. 15, 
2011). 
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Global Compact 
– 
Communication 
on Progress 2008 
– 09 
TATA MOTORS LTD., GLOBAL COMPACT — 
COMMUNICATION ON PROGRESS, available at 
http://www.tatamotors.com/sustainability/p
df/COP-2008-2009.pdf. 
Toyota TOYOTA, http://www.toyota.co.jp (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2011).  
Code of Conduct TOYOTA MOTOR CORP., CODE OF CONDUCT 
(2006), available at 
http://www2.toyota.co.jp/en/vision/code_of_c
onduct/code_of_conduct.pdf. 
Supplier CSR 
Guidelines 
TOYOTA MOTOR CORP., SUPPLIER CSR 
GUIDELINES (2009), available at 
http://www.toyota-
global.com/sustainability/stakeholders/pdf/s
upplier_csr_en.pdf. 
Green 
Purchasing 
Guidelines 2006 
TOYOTA MOTOR CORP., GREEN PURCHASING 
GUIDELINES 2006 (2006), available at 
http://www.toyota.co.jp/en/environment/visi
on/green/pdf/all.pdf. 
Sustainability 
Report 2008 
TOYOTA MOTOR CORP., SUSTAINABILITY 
REPORT 2008 (2009), available at 
http://www.toyotainbusiness.com/Images/T
MC_Sustainability_Report_2008_tcm634-
838999.pdf. 
Sustainability 
Report 2009 
TOYOTA MOTOR CORP., SUSTAINABILITY 
REPORT 2009 (2010), available at 
http://www.toyota.eu/SiteCollectionDocume
nts/Sustainability%20report%202009/2009_
sustainability_report.pdf. 
Sustainability 
Report 2010 
TOYOTA MOTOR CORP., SUSTAINABILITY 
REPORT 2010 (2011), available at 
http://www.toyota-
global.com/sustainability/sustainability_rep
ort/pdf_file_download/10/pdf/sustainability_
report10.pdf  
Volvo VOLVO, http://www.volvocars.com (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
Code of Basic 
Working 
Conditions 
VOLVO CAR CORP., VOLVO CARS GRI REPORT 
2008 (2009), available at http://www.volvo 
cars.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/TopNavi
gation/About/Corporate/VolvoSustainability
/Volvo_Cars_GRI_Report_2008.pdf. 
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GRI Report 2008 VOLVO CAR CORP., VOLVO CARS GRI REPORT 
2008 (2009), available at 
http://www.volvocars.com/SiteCollectionDoc
uments/TopNavigation/About/Corporate/Vol
voSustainability/Volvo_Cars_GRI_Report_2
008.pdf.  
Corporate Report 
With 
sustainability 
2008/9 
VOLVO CAR CORP., 2008/09 CORPORATE 
REPORT WITH SUSTAINABILITY (2009), 
available at 
http://www.volvocars.com/de/top/about/envi
ronment_protection/Documents/Sustainabil
ity_Report_08_09.pdf. 
 
Sustainability 
Report 2009 
VOLVO GROUP, VOLVO GROUP’S 
SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009 (2010), 
available at 
http://www.volvogroup.com/SiteCollectionD
ocuments/VGHQ/Volvo%20Group/Investors/
Financial%20reports/Sustainable%20report
s/sustainability_report_09_eng.pdf. 
Logistics 
Department 
Targets 
Ambitious Targets for Our Own Logistics, 
VOLVO GROUP, 
http://www.volvogroup.com/group/global/en-
gb/responsibility/envdev/env_work/producti
on/logistics/Pages/logistics.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2011). 
Volkswagen VOLKSWAGEN, 
http://www.volkswagenag.com (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2011). 
Sustainability 
Report 2009 
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP, DRIVING IDEAS. 
SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009/2010 (2010), 
available at 
http://www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/vwcor
p/info_center/en/publications/2009/09/sustai
nability_report0.-bin.acq/qual-
BinaryStorageItem.Single.File/VW_Sustain
ability_Report_2009.pdf.  
 
 
